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We study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments. Where
di⁄erent hierarchical government levels tax the same base, one can observe two types
of externalities: a horizontal externality, working among governments of the same level
and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum; and a vertical
externality, working between di⁄erent levels of government and leading to suboptimally
high tax rates. Building on the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), we derive a
discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based
on measurable variables. This test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a
sample of Swiss municipalities that feature direct-democratic ￿scal decision making, so
as to maximize the correspondence with the ￿benevolent￿governments of the theory.
We ￿nd that vertical externalities dominate - they are thus an observed empirical
phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition.
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Tax competition among governments vying for mobile tax bases is one of the most hotly
debated economic policy issues. This debate concerns policy interactions both within and
between countries, since tax competition can arise among nation states as well as among
sub-national jurisdictions in federal countries. The standard ￿horizontal￿view of tax com-
petition among same-level governments is straightforward: competition for mobile tax bases
induces a race to the bottom in the relevant tax rates, potentially resulting in ine¢ ciently
low provision of public goods and an inequitable reallocation of the ￿scal burden towards
immobile tax bases.1
A starkly di⁄erent verdict is reached in a relatively recent literature on ￿vertical￿tax
externalities.2 Such externalities arise in federations of hierarchically nested but ￿scally
independent jurisdictions that tax the same base. If production factors are mobile, taxes
levied by lower-level jurisdictions a⁄ect the size of these jurisdictions￿own tax base as well as
that of the higher-level government. Yet, the lower-level authorities will not fully internalize
the impact of their decisions on the size of the federal tax base, since their subjects only
receive a fraction of the federation tax income. Assuming that tax setters seek to maximize
the welfare of their own subjects, vertical tax externalities therefore imply tax rates that
are too high relative to the social optimum.
The direction of the distortion from uncoordinated tax setting with vertical externalities
is thus exactly opposite to the standard horizontal paradigm. Our aim is to explore whether
vertical tax externalities are a mere theoretical curiosity, or whether they can be identi￿ed
empirically as a signi￿cant phenomenon.
On the face of it, there is good reason to believe that the scope for vertical tax interac-
tions is expanding. Across the globe, ￿scal policy responsibilities are becoming increasingly
vertically fragmented. One tendency is to delegate tax policy from central governments to
regional and local authorities.3 The other tendency is for central governments￿independence
in ￿scal matters to be increasingly circumscribed ￿from above￿ , by international treaties
1Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) provide the seminal formal statements.
2See Keen (1998) for an early survey.
3In the words of Oates (1999), ￿￿scal decentralization is in vogue￿ . For a quanti￿cation of the global
tendency toward ￿scal decentratlisation, see Arzaghi and Henderson (2004).
1and institutions. It therefore seems timely to look for evidence of vertical externalities by
analyzing existing ￿scal federations.
An empirical investigation of this issue faces three major challenges. First, a way must
be found to identify the two types of externalities based on measurable variables. The
structural parameters that determine the relative magnitude of horizontal tax externalities
are inherently unobservable. We therefore derive a discriminating criterion based on a
reduced form of a model featuring both types of externalities. In a nutshell, the reduced
form we employ predicts that, other things equal, more fragmented federations (and thus
smaller sub-federal jurisdictions) will have lower local tax rates if horizontal externalities
dominate and higher local tax rates if vertical externalities dominate. Fragmentation, i.e.
the number of sub-federal jurisdictions, is of course an observable variable.
Second, for the discriminating criterion to be estimable, an empirical setting is required
that provides su¢ cient variation in the main explanatory variable, fragmentation. Although
subfederal redistricting is not an uncommon occurrence, time-series variation in the number
of subfederal jurisdictions of any particular country is unlikely to provide su¢ cient varia-
tion for an estimation of our discriminatory criterion. Cross-sectional regression analysis
across federal countries in turn faces the formidable di¢ culty of controlling for all relevant
constitutional and economic di⁄erences across these countries other than fragmentation, for
the fragmentation e⁄ect to be estimable without bias. Our solution is to exploit the rich
structure of the Swiss ￿scal system. Switzerland is in fact a federation of federations: three
hierarchically nested layers of government account for similar shares of total tax revenue
and public spending, and they all enjoy a very high degree of autonomy in ￿scal matters.
Switzerland therefore provides an empirical setting of 26 autonomous federations (cantons)
subdivided into di⁄erent numbers of autonomous subfederal jurisdictions (municipalities)
all taxing the same bases - exactly what we need to estimate the discriminating criterion.
The third challenge arises from the fact that the theoretical model assumes benevolent
governments at subfederal level. This is critical, since introducing an element of revenue
maximization into governments￿objective function can destroy the one-to-one mapping of
fragmentation e⁄ects to externality types exploited by our test. Unbiased estimation of
the discriminating criterion therefore requires that the data be generated in a context of
2benevolent tax setting at the subfederal level. In this respect too, the speci￿cities of the
Swiss system make this a particularly conducive laboratory. Speci￿cally, we can exploit
the fact that a considerable number of municipalities submit all decisions on local taxes to
direct-democratic scrutiny, be it through a compulsory vote by town-hall assemblies of the
entire citizenry, or through voluntary referenda that can be initiated by citizens on every
proposal by municipal executives to change local taxes. By focusing on municipalities that
set taxes in such direct-democratic fashion, we can base our empirical analysis on a setting
that corresponds well to the theoretical framework.
Our results suggest that, in our dataset, the e⁄ects of vertical externalities dominate
those of horizontal externalities. Vertical externalities are therefore more than a theoretical
curiosity and deserve to be considered systematically in discussions of tax competition and
tax coordination among sub-federal jurisdictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide a selective
overview of the relevant literature. Section 3 develops the discriminating hypothesis theo-
retically. Section 4 provides a brief description of the Swiss ￿scal constitution and of our
data set. The empirical results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 o⁄ers a concluding
discussion.
2 Literature Background
The literature on horizontal tax competition is vast, but the main insight is straightfor-
ward: with horizontal externalities, uncoordinated governments will set tax rates that are
suboptimally low in both e¢ ciency and equity terms.4 The literature on vertical tax com-
petition analyzes ￿scal externalities among di⁄erent hierarchical layers of federations, and it
identi￿es an incentive for lower-level jurisdictions to overtax relative to the social optimum,
even if all tax setters are social-welfare maximizers.5
4Horizontal tax competition can be welfare improving if it acts as a constraint on revenue-maximizing
￿Leviathan￿governments (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) or on rent-seeking private interest groups (Sato,
2003). This paper focuses throughout on governments acting as benevolent social planners.
5Vertical externalities can yield ine¢ ciently high tax rates also if sub-federal governments act as
Leviathans (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2003). We should note furthermore that federal political structures do
not necessarily imply overtaxation, even if we abstract from horizontal tax competition as a potential coun-
terweight. As shown by Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault (1998), it may be possible for the higher-level
jurisdiction (the ￿federation￿ ) to correct for externalities that distort the tax decsions of lower-level jurisdi-
cions (￿states￿ ), if the federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader. In a model with multiple tax bases,
3In view of the contrasting consequences of horizontal and vertical externalities, it is
natural to enquire about the conditions for dominance by one or the other of these forces. In
a federation with a given relative size of federal and state governments (determined in turn
by citizens￿preferences for federal and local public goods), the balance between horizontal
and vertical externalities is determined, on the one hand, by the elasticity of the federation-
wide tax base relative to the consolidated federation tax rate, and, on the other hand, by
the elasticity of the state tax base relative to the state tax rate. Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002) show that the strength of vertical externalities increases in the tax elasticity of the
federation tax base and decreases in the tax elasticity of the state tax base. In addition, the
importance of vertical externalities increases in the size of the federal government relative
to the total (federal plus lower-level) government sector. Whether equilibrium tax rates are
too high or too low depends therefore on the two tax-base elasticities and on the relative
government sizes.6
The tax-base elasticities are of course essentially unmeasurable, which is why we take an
alternative route to identify the two types of tax externalities based on observable variables.
Although our resulting empirical test has no precedent in the literature, there exist a number
of related empirical studies, which fall into four broad categories.
First, a sizeable empirical literature documents horizontal interactions among tax-
setting authorities (for a survey, see Brueckner, 2003). This work con￿rms the existence of
signi￿cant ￿scal ￿reaction functions￿among jurisdictions, both inter- and intra-nationally.
Linking these empirical results to particular theoretical priors, however, is di¢ cult. The
problem is that non-zero slopes for interjurisdictional tax reaction functions are consistent
with a number of theoretical explanations, of which horizontal tax competition is but one.7
In our context, it is particularly interesting to note Revelli￿ s (2003) ￿nding that what could
Hoyt (2001) ￿nds that it may even be possible for the federal government to correct for the vertical exter-
nality in a simultaneous-move Nash game with the lower-level jurisdictions. The distortion-correcting power
of the federation government, however, relies on strong assumptions, namely that the federal government
has complete information and that it fully controls vertical transfers between government levels.
6An exception arises where the states fully tax rents on immobile factors before taxing the mobile factor.
In that case, the horizontal externality always dominates (Proposition 2 in Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002).
7Some authors have devised ways of narrowing down the range of possible explanations for observed ￿scal
interdependencies. For instance, Besley and Case (1995), combine the estimation of reduced-form reaction
functions with the estimation of structural equations arising from a model of ￿yardstick competition￿ ,
thereby overcoming the identi￿cation problem. B￿ttner (2003) tests for horizontal tax competition by
estimating interjurisdictional dependencies of tax bases as well as tax rates.
4appear to re￿ ect horizontal ￿scal interdependencies among sub-national jurisdictions may
in fact to a large extent be driven by vertical externalities, i.e. common reactions to the
￿scal policy of a higher-level ￿scal authority. This strand of the literature highlights the
desirability of theory-based discriminating hypotheses.
Second, a number of authors have explored vertical interactions in tax policies of hi-
erarchically nested governments. Besley and Rosen (1998), who studied excise taxes, and
Esteller-MorØ and SolØ-OllØ (2001), who looked at personal income and general sales taxes,
found that US state taxes historically reacted positively to increases in federal taxes. An-
alyzing Canadian income taxes, Esteller-MorØ and SolØ-OllØ (2002) have also discovered a
positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal tax rate. This suggests
that tax rates of upper-level and lower-level jurisdictions are strategic complements. Other
studies, however, found the opposite relationship. Studying local and central-government
income taxes in a panel of OECD countries, Goodspeed (2000) concluded that higher
central-government tax rates lead to lower local income tax rates. Similarly, Hayashi and
Boadway (2001) found that provincial corporate tax rates in Canada respond negatively to
the federal tax rate. Finally Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2004) have detected no
signi￿cant relationship between federal and state excise taxes in the United States. The
seeming inconsistency of empirical results is in fact not surprising, since the sign of the rela-
tionship is theoretically ambiguous (for discussions, see Besley and Rosen, 1998; and Keen
and Kotsogiannis, 2002). What matters to us is that a statistically signi￿cant relationship
among central and lower-level tax rates was found in most previous studies, which con￿rms
that the existence and behavior of a tax-base co-occupying central authority signi￿cantly
a⁄ects the tax-setting behavior of lower-level jurisdictions.
Third, our empirical speci￿cation bears close resemblance to those applied in several
prior studies which, following Oates (1985), estimated the relationship between government
expenditure and measures of sub-federal jurisdictional fragmentation (for a survey, see
Feld, Kirchg￿ssner and Schaltegger, 2002). These estimations were historically interpreted
as tests of the Leviathan hypothesis. However, in models of horizontal tax competition,
tax rates fall in the degree of fragmentation even with benevolent government; and, in
models featuring vertical externalities, the relationship between government size and de-
5centralization could be positive even in a federation of Leviathan governments (Keen and
Kotsogiannis, 2003). Hence, Oates-style regressions need to be reinterpreted against the
background of recent models of ￿scal federalism and estimated in an appropriate empirical
context. Our study, while bearing super￿cial resemblance to this literature, is couched in
a rigorous theoretical framework and based on a speci￿cally chosen empirical setting that
provides a particularly pure representation of the institutional structure assumed by the
theory.
Fourth, the decentralized structure of the Swiss ￿scal system has been exploited before
for research on tax interactions. Most similar in spirit to our study, Feld et al. (2002)
have regressed government revenues of sub-federal jurisdictions (the sum of cantonal and
municipal revenues) on the fragmentation of cantons. They ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant
e⁄ect of fragmentation on total tax revenue, but some evidence of a negative e⁄ect on
revenue from income taxes. The main di⁄erences between their study and ours are that
we derive and apply an alternative estimating speci￿cation; and that, in keeping with the
theory, we estimate fragmentation e⁄ects on tax rates of the lowest-level ￿scally autonomous
jurisdictions (municipalities), retaining only those with direct-democratic ￿scal systems.8
3 Derivation of a Discriminating Hypothesis
3.1 The Model: Horizontal and Vertical Externalities in an ￿Interna-
tional￿Setting
Assume a federation consisting of a central government and N ￿ 1 identical sub-federal
states. In each state j, a single ￿rm produces a private good according to a concave
production function F(Kj), using capital Kj as the only input.9
8Other prior research on Swiss data has con￿rmed that tax rates of sub-federal Swiss jurisdictions do
a⁄ect the corresponding tax bases. Kirchg￿ssner and Pommerehne (1996) and Feld and Kirchg￿ssner (2001)
show that a jurisdiction￿ s share of residents belonging to a particular income class responds with the ex-
pected negative sign to the relevant tax rate. Not surprisingly, this e⁄ect is most pronounced for high-income
individuals. Similar evidence is produced in Feld and Kirchg￿ssner (2003), who document a negative rela-
tionship between corporate tax rates on employment and ￿rm numbers. Finally, Feld and Matsusaka (2003)
￿nd that constraints on the ￿scal autonomy of cantonal executives matter, since cantons with stronger
direct-democratic controls over ￿scal matters have signi￿cantly lower levels of public spending. This re-
sult suggests that cantonal executives do have a taste for public expenditure that is higher than the level
preferred by the citizenry.
9Our model is a variant of the framework developed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). We use their
notation where possible, in order to facilitate comparability. Note that K does not necessarily represent
6Due to free capital mobility inside the federation, capital earns a unique post-tax return
￿. The central and state governments tax capital at a consolidated rate ￿j = T +tj, where
T is the central government￿ s unit capital tax rate and tj denotes the state￿ s unit capital
tax. Normalizing the price of the private good to one, the pro￿t maximizing condition
F0(Kj) = ￿ + ￿j implies the demand for capital in each state:
Kj = K (￿ + ￿j);
with K0 (￿ + ￿j) = 1=F00 (Kj) < 0.
We de￿ne the state-level rent, ￿ (￿ + ￿j), as the di⁄erence between the value of produc-
tion and the cost of capital:10
￿ (￿ + ￿j) = F [K (￿ + ￿j)] ￿ (￿ + ￿j)K (￿ + ￿j): (1)
In addition to the private good, there exist two distinct publicly provided goods (which,
although speci￿c to each state, we shall refer to as ￿public goods￿ ): states provide gj,
￿nanced through tj, and the central government uses T to ￿nance G. G and gj express
spending per state, taxes are spent exhaustively on the respective public goods, and public
goods are produced with constant returns. The governments￿budget constraints can be
written as
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Each state is populated by a large number of identical residents. We assume that
the mass of residents in each state is equal to one. Residents are endowed with identical
stocks of investable capital, e. Capital can be invested within the federation (Sj), where it




j Kj), or in the rest of
capital but can stand for any mobile factor (and tax base).
10Note that we have ￿
0 = ￿K.
7the world (ROW). Inward investment by ROW residents is assumed to be zero.11 Returns
on investment are given by ￿￿ for the ROW and by ￿ for the federation. For simplicity,
we normalize ￿￿ to zero. Thus, ￿ will take negative values if after-tax returns in the
federation are lower than in the ROW.12 Rents accruing in state j are distributed equally
among residents. Individuals derive utility from investment income and from public goods.
We assume that they perceive income from domestic and foreign investment as imperfect
substitutes. Speci￿cally, we assume the following aggregate indirect utility function for
state j:
Uj = (e ￿ Sj) + u[(1 + ￿)Sj + ￿ (￿ + ￿j)] + ￿(gj;G);
where u(￿) and ￿(gj;G) are strictly increasing concave functions.
Indirect utility is linear in ROW investment income and concave in home income, which
implies a degree of ￿home bias￿in capital allocation.13
Maximizing utility with respect to Sj, and using the rent function (1) and the govern-
ment budget constraints (2), we can write the indirect utility function for state j as
Wj = (e ￿ S (￿;￿j)) + u[(1 + ￿)S (￿;￿j) + ￿ (￿ + ￿j)]
+￿
h
tjK (￿ + ￿j); 1
N
P











K (￿ + ￿j); (4)
which implies the e⁄ect of a change in state j￿ s tax rate on ￿:
11This is an assumption of convenience. Two-way investment ￿ ows complicate the model without changing
our qualitative results.
12In order to have positive K in equilibrium, we assume that (￿ + ￿j) > 0.
13Our ￿international￿framework di⁄ers from the intertemporal setting of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).
The main change is that we switch the concave part of the utility function to the investment destination
that is of interest (the domestic economy in our case, the second period in theirs). One implication is that,






















where the last equation holds if all regions are identical.
State governments are assumed to be benevolent in the sense that they maximize the
welfare of their own subjects, but they do not take into account the e⁄ect of their actions
on residents of other states. This behavior, combined with the fact that the two levels of
government tax the same base, gives rise to the two potential externalities, horizontal and
vertical.
The ￿rst-order condition of the government in state j, evaluated at a symmetric equi-























Condition (6) implicitly determines the (symmetric) equilibrium state tax rate. Fur-
thermore, we de￿ne W as indirect utility under symmetry of tax rates; so that, taking the
derivative of W with respect to the (symmetric) state tax rate, we obtain

















Setting equation (7) to zero implicitly de￿nes the socially optimal state tax rate for a
given federal tax rate. More generally, the expression indicates the e⁄ect on social welfare
of a small symmetric change in the equilibrium state tax rate. Thus, if states play Nash and
the equilibrium outcome is determined by (6), Wt indicates which externality dominates.
In a situation where Wt, evaluated at equilibrium, is positive, a slight increase in all state
taxes would increase social welfare, and state taxes are therefore too low from a social
viewpoint. Conversely, if Wt is negative, state taxes are too high.
9We can rewrite equation (7) in a more easily interpretable form. Subtracting (6) from
(7) and introducing notation for the elasticity of utility with respect to the supply of public




















The term in square brackets determines whether equilibrium state taxes are too high or
too low, the ￿rst term being unambiguously positive (the negative sign of K0 cancels the
initial negative sign). The term ￿"g
@￿
@t, which is positive since
@￿
@t < 0, represents the hori-






Expression (8) allows us to identify the determinants of the di⁄erent tax externalities.
The two determinants are (i) the elasticities of the public goods in the utility function ("g
and "G), and (ii) the sensitivity of the rate of return to changes in the state tax rates (
@￿
@t),
which in turn depends on the elasticities of demand and supply of capital (see (5)). Loosely
speaking, vertical externalities are more likely to dominate the greater is the utility share of
the state public good, and the higher is the sensitivity of capital to relative returns between
the federation and the outside world compared to relative returns among states inside the





K0). All parameter con￿gurations above the boundary imply dominance
of horizontal externalities, and the area below the boundary is characterized by dominant






which horizontal externalities dominate regardless of relative capital sensitivity.
Given (8), equilibrium state taxes could be either too high or too low. The model yields
unambiguous predictions only in some special cases. For example, if we assume that the
federation is a small open economy, such that ￿ = ￿￿, then one state￿ s tax decision will not
a⁄ect the supply of capital available to other states.14 In this case, only vertical externalities
exist. On the other hand, if the federation exists in autarky, so that the federation supply
of capital is completely inelastic (S = S), then state tax policies do not a⁄ect the federation
tax base, and thus only horizontal externalities exist (Wt > 0). In con￿gurations that fall
between these polar cases, the sign of Wt can be positive or negative, depending on which
14In order to ￿x ￿ = ￿
￿, the model would have to allow for capital in￿ ows.
10externality dominates.
It is important to note that expression (8) and all our subsequent derivations do not
rely on assumptions about the determination of the federal tax rate. In fact, expression
(8) holds irrespective of whether the federal government sets taxes simultaneously with
the states in a Nash game or sequentially in a Stackelberg game. Obviously, however, (8)
provides no indication of whether overall taxes (￿) are too high or too low.
3.2 The Discriminating Hypothesis
Given their starkly di⁄erent implications for equilibrium tax rates, it is of evident interest
to distinguish between horizontal and vertical externalities empirically. The problem is that
the relevant structural parameters de￿ning "g, "G and
@￿
@t are unobservable. We therefore
seek a reduced form of the model that is based on observables yet allows to distinguish rigor-
ously between dominance of horizontal externalities and dominance of vertical externalities.
We show that the relationship between the number of states (N) and the equilibrium tax
rate, provides us with such a discriminating hypothesis.
Based on the equilibrium condition for state tax rates (6), we can compute the e⁄ect of










The denominator Et is analytically involved and cannot be signed a priori. Keen and
Kotsogiannis (2004) justify Et being negative by resorting to some additional assumptions.
We have conducted extensive extensive simulations, detailed in the Appendix, which con￿rm
that Et is negative in an overwhelming majority of parameter con￿gurations.































11Using (8), we can rewrite this expression as
EN = ￿
1
N (N ￿ 1)
Wt:15 (10)
Hence, the e⁄ect of an increase in the number of states is inversely related to the
balance between horizontal and vertical externalities expressed by Wt. This, together with
(9), implies the discriminating hypothesis expressed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 In symmetric equilibrium with dominant horizontal externalities (Wt > 0)
the state tax rate decreases in the number of states. Conversely, in symmetric equilibrium
with dominant vertical externalities (Wt < 0) the state tax rate increases in the number of
states.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. We show the e⁄ect of an increase in the
number of states on Wt for di⁄erent relative elasticities of federal capital supply and state
capital demand (details on the underlying simulations are given in the Appendix). In Figure
2, each solid line (labeled Wt ("G)) represents Wt for di⁄erent capital supply and demand
elasticities. When "G increases, Wt = 0 holds for lower values of the ratio of elasticities,
which implies that a higher utility weight of the federation public good expands the domain
of dominant vertical externalities. The dashed lines in the Figure represent the e⁄ect on
Wt of an increase in N relative to the base case of the solid line, and the dotted lines
illustrate the e⁄ect of a decrease in N. We observe that changes in N pivot Wt around the
point where neither externality dominates (Wt = 0). Hence, when horizontal externalities
dominate (Wt > 0), an increase in N reinforces the externality (and lowers the equilibrium
state tax rate).16 Conversely, when vertical externalities dominate (Wt < 0), an increase in
N leads to even stronger vertical externalities (and raises the equilibrium state tax rate).
These relationships, via (10), imply Proposition 1. Figure 3 presents a similar illustration
for the second determinant of Wt, the relative size of state and federal governments (implied
by the ratio of utility elasticities of state and federal public goods,
"g
"G). We represent the
15Although the underlying models are not identical, this expression turns out to be exactly the same as
expression (32) in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004).
16This feature of the model mirrors the well known result that small countries compete more vigorously
for mobile tax bases and thus set lower tax rates than large countries in models of purely horizontal tax
competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991).
12relationship for di⁄erent curvatures of the assumed state-level production function F(Kj).
Again, we observe that increases in N increase jWtj, that is they exacerbate the dominant
externality.
Our Proposition o⁄ers a ready base for empirical analysis. Equilibrium condition (6)
implies that, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium state tax (tj) is a function of two observable
variables, the federation tax rate (T) and the number of states (N):
tj = f (N;T)jutility fn, production fn (11)
Our Proposition states that the sign of
@tj
@N re￿ ects dominance of horizontal or vertical
externalities. There is no theoretical prior on the sign of
@tj
@T , which represents the tax
reaction function between state and federation governments. Whether the tax rates of
hierarchically nested government levels are strategic substitutes or complements is therefore
an empirical issue (see, e.g. Besley and Rosen, 1998).
3.3 From Theory to an Empirical Model
According to Proposition 1, the sign of
@tj
@N re￿ ects the relative dominance of horizontal
and vertical externalities. The basic empirical task is therefore straightforward: regress tj
on N. However, when taking expression (11) to data, we need to impose further structure.
Theory provides no guidance as to the appropriate functional form. The natural starting
point is a linear additive speci￿cation:
tj = ￿0 + ￿1N + ￿2T + uj; (12)
where u is a stochastic error term.
A number of additional estimation issues need to be addressed. We discuss them in
turn.
3.3.1 Multiple Federations
The theoretical model features a single federation in static equilibrium. Identi￿cation of
the parameters in equation (12), however, requires varying observations not just on tj but
13also on N and T. One approach would be to use time-series data on a single federation.
Since changes in the de￿nition of sub-federal administrative regions are rare and, when
they do occur, mostly marginal, comparison across multiple federations is a considerably
more promising source of observable variation in N. We work with a panel of the 26 Swiss
cantons (the ￿federations￿in our data) comprising varying numbers of municipalities (the
￿states￿in our data). We use the subscript i to denote cantons.
3.3.2 Fragmentation of Federations with Asymmetric States
What is the empirical counterpart of N? Our theoretical model features symmetric states
and identical state taxes in Nash equilibrium. However, cantons have di⁄erent sizes, they set
di⁄erent tax rates, and they di⁄er in numerous relevant respects other than size. Therefore,
we estimate equation (12) municipality-by-municipality.17 From the municipalities￿point of
view, a high N in a symmetric federation implies that each municipality is small. Hence, we
express fragmentation as a municipality-speci￿c variable ￿smallness￿ , nij = 1 ￿ sij, where
sij is the population share of municipality j in its corresponding canton i.
Furthermore, cantons and municipalities are likely to di⁄er in structural parameters
a⁄ecting Ti and tij, such as preferences for central and local public goods, federal and
local tax-base elasticities, and taxation of immobile factors. We thus control for relevant
cantonal and municipal characteristics that impact on equilibrium tax rates in addition to
fragmentation, by including relevant municipality-speci￿c and canton-speci￿c explanatory
variables.
Our estimating equation thus becomes:
tij = ￿0 + ￿1nij + ￿2Ti + Xij￿ + vij; (13)
where X is a row vector of exogenous controls, and ￿ is a vector of parameters. The
elements of X can be speci￿c to j or to i.
17It would arguably have been more intuitive to treat any intra-federation variation in state tax rates
as random noise, and to regress the mean state tax rate on a number that re￿ ects the fragmentation of
the federation and on federation-level averaged controls. However, such an empirical approach would be
ine¢ cient, as it would discard intra-federation information; and it would most likely yield biased coe¢ cient
estimates, as there is no reason to expect federation-level random components to be uncorrelated with
fragmentation or with any other state-level regressor.
14A potentially important issue concerning ￿1, our main parameter of interest, is the
argument of Zax (1989) that small jurisdictions might have to set higher tax rates than
large jurisdictions because of scale economies in public goods provision. This argument
points towards a positive relation between equilibrium tax rates and fragmentation, ceteris
paribus. Hence, we include the size of municipalities among the controls X. With increasing
returns to scale, the expected sign of the coe¢ cient on this variable is negative.
3.3.3 Endogenous Federation Tax Rate
As discussed above, our discriminating hypothesis is independent of how the federation gov-
ernment sets its tax rate. Yet, equilibrium federation and state tax rates will of course be
interdependent. In addition, since Ti is not independent of Ni (and therefore of nij), we can-
not estimate equation (12) consistently without including Ti. We address the endogeneity
of Ti via two-stage least squares estimation.18
3.3.4 Benevolent State Governments
Our discriminating hypothesis is derived in a model with benevolent governments. As
shown by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), revenue maximization by state governments works
toward lower state tax rates as fragmentation increases. Hence, with Leviathan governments
estimated coe¢ cients on nij are biased downward. In order to avoid such bias against the
vertical externalities hypothesis, we restrict the empirical analysis to municipalities that set
taxes via direct-democratic political processes.
18Furthermore, one might suspect that the theoretical model warrants inclusion of an interaction term
between T and N. This turns out not to be the case. In our model, the federation government will maximize






























which depends on N only via t (such that t = f((Tjt);N)).
154 Taxation in a Federation of Federations: Switzerland as a
￿Fiscal Laboratory￿
4.1 The Swiss Fiscal Constitution
Switzerland has a highly decentralized constitution featuring three jurisdictional levels (fed-
eral, cantonal and municipal) that account for roughly similar shares of the total tax take.19
Cantons and municipalities raise taxes on four main bases: corporate income and capital,
personal income and wealth. Table 1 shows that personal income is by far the most im-
portant tax base, accounting for well over 70 percent of municipal tax revenue. Corporate
taxes account for around 13 percent of municipal tax revenue. Similar orders of magnitude
apply for the allocation across tax bases of cantonal revenue (Table 1).
Five features of the Swiss ￿scal constitution bear close resemblance to the theoretical
setting within which we derived Proposition 1 and thereby make it a uniquely suited setting
for an empirical test:
1. Multiple comparable federations. The three-tier Swiss ￿scal hierarchy includes 26 fed-
erations (i.e. cantons) with di⁄erent numbers of states (i.e. municipalities). Cantons
and municipalities are relatively similar in many respects that a⁄ect their locational
attractiveness - an implication of the smallness of Switzerland -, and they tax almost
perfectly identical bases. Furthermore, there is little spending specialization across
municipalities: most municipalities are ￿general purpose￿governments, with largely
similar spending duties. Yet, cantons and municipalities di⁄er signi￿cantly in terms
of the tax rates and schedules they apply. The highest tax rate in our sample of
municipal corporate income taxes is more than six times higher than the lowest com-
parable tax rate. At the cantonal level, the highest tax rate (Geneva) is more than
seven times higher than the lowest one (Schwyz). For personal income taxes the range
is somewhat narrower, but the highest rates still exceed the lowest rates by up to ￿ve
times (see Figure 4 for an illustration).
19According to the OECD, ￿the Swiss Confederation is more decentralized than any other OECD country￿
(Carey, Gordon and Thalmann, 1999, p. 5). The revenue shares of the central, cantonal and municipal
governments have remained at a stable 30, 40 and 30 percent respectively over the 1980s and 1990s (Feld et
al., 2002).
162. Fiscal autonomy. There are virtually no restrictions on the tax-setting powers of
sub-national jurisdictions. Each of the 26 cantons has its own tax laws, de￿ning 26
di⁄erent sets of tax schedules. Based on the legally de￿ned basic tax rates, cantonal
and municipal authorities autonomously set multipliers that de￿nes e⁄ectively applied
tax rates.20
3. Small vertical and horizontal transfers among jurisdictions. Federal statistics show
that, summed across all jurisdictions and averaged over our sample years, net vertical
transfers from cantons to municipalities constituted 1.9 percent of municipal revenue,
while net horizontal transfers among municipalities corresponded to 3.6 percent of
municipal revenue.
4. Overlapping tax bases. Within each canton, tax bases are identical for cantonal and
municipal taxes, since they are de￿ned by the cantonal tax laws. In addition, tax bases
are very similar even across cantons, since the information used to calculate national
taxes is taken from the tax forms ￿lled in to report to the cantonal authorities, which
imposes a certain degree of uniformity in the de￿nition of tax bases. Since 2001,
tax bases for direct taxes have been harmonized across cantons by federal law. Most
municipalities set a single multiplier that shifts the cantonal tax schedule within and
across all tax bases. Hence, the progressivity of tax schedules is the same for municipal
and cantonal taxes in a majority of cases.21 This arguably implies that municipal
decision makers focus the choice of their multiplier on tax bases (and certain brackets
thereof) with the largest impact on revenue, i.e. personal income taxes (see Table 1).
5. Direct democracy. Municipalities di⁄er considerably in terms of the direct demo-
cratic constraints they impose on the ￿scal discretion of their elected executives. A
signi￿cant number of municipalities take decisions on tax rates through a vote of the
entire citizenry. This institutional setting provides a close empirical counterpart to
the social-welfare maximizing decision makers assumed in the underlying theory, and
we therefore restrict the analysis to municipalities that feature direct-democratic ￿scal
20The ￿scal constitutions of some cantons constrain municipal tax-setting autonomy. We control for this
in the estimations.
21To be precise, this system applies in 92 of our 103 sample municipalities. The remaining eleven munic-
ipalities enjoy some discretion over tax schedules across tax bases.
17decision making.
4.2 Data
One implication of the decentralized Swiss governance structure is that comparable data
on municipalities are hard to come by. For the purpose of this study, we have assembled
a panel data set of municipal and cantonal tax rates for the years 1985, 1991, 1995, 1998
and 2001. The ￿assembly￿sample contains the 38 largest municipalities (distributed across
15 cantons) that set taxes via a show of hands at an annual assembly of all resident Swiss
citizens. The ￿referendum￿ sample contains the 103 largest municipalities (distributed
across 23 cantons) whose ￿scal constitutions feature compulsory or voluntary referenda
for decisions on tax rates. The assembly sample is contained in the referendum sample.
All municipalities in our data set therefore feature direct-democratic controls on local tax
decisions, and, for obvious reasons, direct democracy can be considered particularly strong
in the assembly subsample.22
4.2.1 The Dependent Variable: Sub-National Tax Rates
Our data set is unique in providing information on personal as well as corporate sub-national
taxes. Since most municipalities do not decide their tax rates individually for di⁄erent tax
bases, but instead set a single multiplier on the cantonal tax schedule, our main focus is on
a revenue-weighted average of standardized versions of the nine tax variables. We refer to
this aggregate as the ￿tax index￿ .23 Both municipal and cantonal tax indices have mean
zero by construction.
The tax index is constructed on the base of e⁄ective cantonal and municipal tax rates
for a set of representative tax payers. We chose a set that is small enough to be manageable
but large enough to represent the progressivity of tax schedules. Using ANOVA, we found
that a set of nine tax variables is su¢ cient to capture most of the variance in tax schedules
across jurisdictions. These nine variables are as follows:
22We are grateful to Lars Feld for the generous provision of the data on municipal decision making. These
data are based on a survey conducted in the mid-1990s.
23Standardization consists of mean-di⁄erencing and division by the sample standard deviation for each
tax variable. Within each tax category, tax variables are weighted equally. Hence, for example, the three
tax rates on personal income all enter the index with a weight of
1
3 times the share of personal income taxes
in total tax revenue.
18￿ Personal income taxes (3 variables). Personal income tax schedules are based on
income and family status (single, married, number of children). We collected income
tax rates for a median-income single household, for a median-income married house-
hold with two children, and for a high-income married household with two children.
High income is de￿ned as the average income of households in the highest reported
statistical category, which is bounded below by a taxable annual income of 200,000
Swiss francs (t140,000 U.S. dollars).
￿ Personal wealth taxes (2 variables). Personal wealth taxes follow a progressive sched-
ule in most cantons. Therefore, we collected tax rates for a person with taxable wealth
of 200,000 francs and of 5 million francs (t3.6 million dollars) respectively.
￿ Corporate income taxes (3 variables). Swiss corporate income taxes are generally
based on ￿rms￿pro￿tability and capital. ANOVA showed that the main contribution
to the variance in corporate income tax rates comes from pro￿tability. We therefore
collected tax rates for median-capital ￿rms with pro￿ts amounting to 2, 9 and 32
percent respectively of capital. The chosen pro￿tability values represent ￿rst sextile,
median and ￿fth sextile pro￿tability values for Swiss ￿rms over our sample period.
￿ Corporate capital taxes (1 variable). We included the corporate capital tax rate
applicable to a ￿rm with median capital stock, since most cantons levy proportional
capital taxes.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our sample tax rates. We can appreciate the
considerable variance in tax rates across cantons and municipalities (see also Figure 4).
It is furthermore evident that the main tax schedules (on personal income and corporate
income) exhibit signi￿cant progressivity.
4.2.2 Independent Variables
The main variable for our discriminating hypothesis is fragmentation. As discussed above,
the federation-speci￿c N of the theoretical model with a single symmetric federation is
represented by nij in the empirical model that features multiple federations composed of
asymmetric states. We de￿ne the smallness of a municipality relative to its canton as
19nij = 1 ￿
Pij
Pi , where Pij is the population of municipality j in canton i, and Pi is the
respective cantonal population. For the population measures, we consider only residents
with Swiss citizenship, since what we seek to represent is municipalities￿political weight in
the canton.
A range of control variables are included in all estimated equations (see Table 2 for
summary statistics).
￿ As stipulated by our theoretical model, we have to control for the respective cantonal
tax rates. These tax rates are instrumented via two-stage least squares with two
identifying canton-level variables: the canton population living in urban areas and
the cantonal area.
￿ A number of regressors are chosen to control for di⁄erences in municipalities￿public
revenue needs. Municipal population controls for potential increasing returns in public
goods production. A negative coe¢ cient on this variable would be consistent with
increasing returns. The share of population over 20 and the share of population
over 65 are included as proxies of dependency ratios, and thus of demands on local
budgets for education, health care and social security. In turn, a positive coe¢ cient on
municipal area might imply that public goods provision becomes costlier if required
to cover a bigger area. Note that the area of municipalities in Switzerland is positively
correlated with the mountainousness of their topography, which adds further demands
on public infrastructure. Finally, we include a dummy for municipalities that represent
urban centers, to account for the fact that these municipalities often supply particular
center-related public goods such as cultural facilities or inner-city policing.
￿ Further variables are included to control for di⁄erences in municipalities￿locational
attractiveness, and thus their inherent appeal to potential tax payers. We include the
following variables: distance to the nearest freeway, distance to the nearest interna-
tional airport, and length of lake shore within the municipality.
￿ In keeping with existing empirical work on ￿scal policy in Switzerland, a dummy for
the Latin (i.e. French and Italian speaking) cantons picks up attitudinal di⁄erences
between those cantons and the German speaking majority.
20￿ Additional canton dummies are included to control for certain institutional idiosyn-
crasies. Although most municipalities enjoy complete autonomy in setting their tax
rates, there are some exceptions. Five of the 26 cantons have harmonized municipal
tax rates on corporate income and capital, whilst leaving municipalities￿freedom to
set personal taxes unconstrained. We therefore include a dummy that equals one for
the relevant cantons and taxes.24
5 Empirical Results: Horizontal and Vertical Tax Competi-
tion in Switzerland
5.1 Smallness and Average Tax Rates
We estimate municipality-level regressions of equation (12) for the tax index. The results
are presented in Table 3. In order to facilitate interpretation and comparison of estimated
coe¢ cients, all non-dichotomous variables are expressed in natural logs, and all parameter
estimates are also reported as standardized (beta) coe¢ cients. Standard errors are based
on robust estimated covariance matrices, with municipality-level clustering to account for
correlation within municipalities across time.25
Cantonal tax rates are instrumented via two-stage least squares. We report Hansen￿ s
J statistic for overidentifying restrictions (Sargan test). Rejection of the null hypothesis
through this test suggests misspeci￿cation - most likely due to violation of the orthogonality
condition for the chosen instruments.26 In addition, we report F statistics on the identifying
instruments of the ￿rst-stage regressions as a test of instrument quality.
Column I of Table 3 presents results from the baseline regression in the assembly sample
24We deliberately do not include canton ￿xed e⁄ects, since such ￿xed e⁄ects would pick up most of the
variability in Ti and thus introduce endogeneity bias. However, some institutional idiosyncracies require
additional controls. We include a dummy for the canton of Geneva, which features joint taxation and a
special revenue sharing arrangement between cantonal and municipal authorities; for the canton of Uri,
which is unique in featuring a proportional municipal personal income tax schedule; and for the canton of
St. Gallen, which has a unique municipal corporate tax schedule. Since they only apply to corporate taxes,
the dummy of cantons with harmonized municipal tax rates and the dummy for St. Gallen are dropped
from the regressions for personal taxes. Conversely, the dummy for the canton of Uri is dropped from the
regressions for corporate taxes. We include all these dummies in the regressions for the tax index.
25To ignore intertemporal correlation within municipalities results in considerably (but misleadingly)
smaller estimated standard errors.
26We have also run every regression using the two-step e¢ cient generalized method of moments estimator.
Since our ￿ndings remained substantially una⁄ected, we chose to report standard instrumental variables
regressions. All results mentioned but not shown are of course available on request.
21of municipalities (i.e. those featuring the most direct system of citizen participation in tax
setting). The estimated coe¢ cient on smallness is positive and statistically signi￿cant at
the 95 percent con￿dence level. This, our main result, supports the vertical-externalities
hypothesis: municipalities that account for a smaller share of cantonal population have
higher tax rates, other things equal.
The second data column of Table 3 reports results for an equivalent regression in the
larger referendum sample of municipalities. Again we ￿nd a positive coe¢ cient on small-
ness, although statistical signi￿cance now only obtains at the 90 percent con￿dence level.
Conforming with our priors, the dominance of vertical externalities is weakened as we in-
corporate municipalities with less immediate forms of direct democracy (and hence greater
scope for a self-in￿ ating public sector), but the result survives: vertical externalities domi-
nate.
Can we have con￿dence in these results? Our estimations appear largely plausible, and,
with R2s of 0.79 and 0.64 respectively, the model succeeds in explaining a large share of
the variation in municipal tax rates.
The theory explicitly suggests inclusion of the federation tax rate as an explanatory
variable, even though it gives us no prior on the sign of the coe¢ cient (see equation (11)).
We ￿nd that the estimated coe¢ cients on instrumented cantonal tax indices are positive in
both samples. Statistical signi￿cance, however, is found only in the assembly sample. The
related instrument diagnostic tests are broadly satisfactory. The J statistic is borderline
signi￿cant (casting some doubt on the applicability of the orthogonality assumption) in
the assembly sample, while, at 6.68, the ￿rst-stage F statistic for the referendum sample
just satis￿es the criterion reported by Stock and Yogo (2003, Table 1) for a two-stage least
squares estimate that is allowed to exhibit at most 20 percent of the bias implied in its OLS
counterpart.
Our ￿ndings thus suggest that municipal and cantonal taxes are complements rather
than substitutes. One might suspect this result to be driven by an omitted variable, mu-
nicipal income. Indeed, if tax authorities target a certain level of revenue per capita, then
municipal and cantonal tax rates will co-move in opposite direction to cantonal incomes. We
have explored this issue by including cantonal income as an additional regressor. Our ver-
22dict from this was not to include cantonal income for the remainder of the analysis, because
(i) inclusion of cantonal income in principle raises additional concerns about simultaneity
issues, because (ii) the coe¢ cient on this variable was never found to be signi￿cant, and
because (iii) the estimated coe¢ cients on any of the remaining regressors were not a⁄ected
signi￿cantly.
Of the regressors that we include to control for municipalities￿revenue needs, we ￿nd
that area and urban center have the expected positive sign and are statistically signi￿cant
in at least one of the two samples. The magnitudes are considerable. The coe¢ cient on
urban center in the referendum sample, for example, implies that city-center municipalities
have tax rates that are 39 (= 100 ￿ (e0:33 ￿ 1)) percent higher than other municipalities,
other things equal. Estimated coe¢ cients on population, however, are negative, albeit not
statistically signi￿cant.27 Somewhat surprisingly, population under 20 and population over
65 do not seem important: the estimated coe¢ cients are small, imprecisely measured and
change signs across samples.
As for the three locational attractiveness variables, we ￿nd that average taxes rise
signi￿cantly in distance to the nearest international airport, while there is some evidence
that access to a lake shore has a weak negative impact on municipal taxes, and distance to
the nearest freeway has no discernible e⁄ect. Peripherality thus appears as a particularly
strong determinant of municipal tax rates: our estimates for example imply that doubling
a municipality￿ s distance to the nearest airport raises its tax rate by around one-half.
Finally, where the coe¢ cient estimates are precisely measured, our evidence suggests that
municipalities in Latin cantons, and those in cantons with harmonized municipal tax rates,
apply lower average tax rates.28
5.2 Robustness
We subject the baseline results of Table 3 to a number of robustness checks, which we
present in Tables 4 and 5. The two tables report results of equivalent estimations based
27Our results therefore weakly support the Zax (1989) hypothesis of increasing returns of public goods
provision. We also experimented with a quadratic population term, and found no economically larger or
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect.
28The relatively low tax tax rates found for municipalities in Latin cantons may seem surprising, given
that the Latin cantons on average have larger public sectors than their German-speaking counterparts. The
main explanation is that Latin cantons on average have a lower ratio of municipal to cantonal tax burdens.
23on the assembly sample and on the referendum sample respectively. Our main ￿nding, the
positive coe¢ cient on the smallness variable, turns out to be robust. We investigate three
issues.
First, we estimate the model separately for each year. To convey a representative
impression of those estimations, we report results for our ￿rst and last sample year (1985
and 2001) in Tables 4 and 5. We ￿nd that the positive coe¢ cient on smallness applies
throughout our sample period. While this e⁄ect has become appreciably stronger over
time in the assembly sample (Table 4), the reverse time change appears in the referendum
sample (Table 5). Our results must therefore be considered inconclusive as to whether the
detected dominance of vertical externalities is becoming stronger or weaker with time. Our
estimates for the remaining regressors are reassuringly similar across sample years.
Second, we take account of the possibility that municipal tax rates are spatially corre-
lated for reasons that are not captured by the model - which of course features a number of
spatially correlated regressors and thereby in itself explains spatial correlation in municipal
tax rates. The ￿rst is to compute spatial autocorrelation tests, via Moran￿ s I, on the regres-
sion residuals.29 While we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation
of the residuals in the assembly sample, this is not true for the referendum sample. We thus
seek to reestimate the model in a way that is consistent and e¢ cient also in the presence
of spatial error correlation. Since we do not want to forego instrumenting the cantonal
tax rate, we apply the spatial GMM estimator proposed by Conley (1999), which permits
structural estimation with a covariance matrix that implies a distance weighting within a
certain neighborhood. Neighborhood in turn is de￿ned as applying to all municipalities
located within a certain radius of the municipality in question. Distances are Euclidean,
and municipalities￿centroids are taken as the ￿steeple￿de￿nition from the Swiss statistical
o¢ ce. We report results for neighborhood distance cuto⁄s of 15 kilometers, but we found
them to be very robust to changing this threshold. Our ￿ndings, given in the fourth and
￿fth columns of Tables 4 and 5, are easily summarized: estimation via spatial GMM re-
turns essentially the same results, in terms of both point estimates and inference, as our
29The verdict on spatial autocorrelation remained unchanged when we computed the Moran statistic with
distance cuto⁄ values larger than our default of 15 kilometers.
24baseline 2SLS estimations.30 Spatial error correlation therefore does not appear to a⁄ect
our estimates and inference signi￿cantly.
Third, we estimate our structural model with OLS, thereby ignoring the potential en-
dogeneity of cantonal tax rates. The results are presented in the ￿nal two columns of
Tables 4 and 5. In the assembly sample (Table 4), we ￿nd that the OLS estimates are
virtually identical to the 2SLS estimates, even concerning the coe¢ cient on cantonal tax
rates. In the referendum sample (Table 5), the OLS coe¢ cients on the cantonal tax rate are
signi￿cantly larger than their 2SLS counterparts. This suggests that the strategic comple-
mentarity of municipal and cantonal tax rates is two-directional: municipalities on average
react to higher cantonal tax rates by raising their own tax rate, and cantonal governments
react to higher municipal tax rates by raising the cantonal tax rate. We note that, even in
the referendum sample, OLS estimation yields estimated coe¢ cient on smallness that are
positive, although not statistically signi￿cant. The ￿nding that municipal tax rates increase
in smallness is not therefore driven by the model we adopt to instrument for the cantonal
tax rate (but obvious concerns over the endogeneity of cantonal tax rates lead us to prefer
the 2SLS estimates).
5.3 Smallness and Tax Rates on Di⁄erent Tax Bases
We ￿nd robustly positive coe¢ cients on smallness in our regressions of the tax index,
which is a revenue-weighted average of tax rates on a set of representative tax bases. Even
though the municipal tax decision in almost all cases concerns but a single number, i.e. the
multiplier applied to cantonal tax rates across the entire schedule, it might be interesting to
estimate our model separately for tax rates on individual representative tax bases. Given
that personal income taxes contribute over 70 percent of municipal tax revenue (Table 2),
we naturally assume that municipalities￿tax decisions focus most strongly on the rates they
imply for personal income taxes. Hence, it is the municipal tax rates on personal income
that are a priori expected to be most sensitive to economic and political incentives.
Our estimation results for tax rates on individual tax bases are reported in Table 6
(for the assembly sample) and Table 7 (for the referendum sample).31 R2s remain high
30This ￿nding also applies to the panel regressions of Table 3.
31In order not to overload the tables, we do not report results on control variables other than the in-
25(particularly for personal income taxes), the strategic complementarity of municipal and
cantonal tax remains the dominant result, and the instrument tests are satisfactory in a
majority of cases (although our instruments appear to be too weak in most of the estimations
for taxes other than personal income).
Most importantly, the estimations con￿rm that vertical externalities dominate for the
tax rates that we assume to be most sensitive to the cost-bene￿t calculations of the voting
citizens: with respect to personal income taxes, the estimated coe¢ cients on smallness are
all positive. The fact that this e⁄ect is found to be stronger in the assembly sample than
in the referendum sample mirrors the equivalent result found already in our regressions for
the tax index.
Finally, an intriguing pattern emerges in the regressions for corporate taxes. Seven of the
eight corporate-tax regressions in Tables 6 and 7 yield negative coe¢ cients on smallness
(and the one positive coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant). These results must be
treated with some caution, since, of the seven negative coe¢ cients, only one is statistically
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Nonetheless, they invite the conjecture that horizontal
externalities dominate in the setting of corporate taxes, and that the dominance of vertical
externalities applies only to personal taxes. Given the imprecision of the estimates and the
particular institutional setting in which municipalities decide on a unique multiplier, our
result cannot be more than a loose conjecture, which it would be interesting to investigate
further in an empirical setting of jurisdictions that decide separately on tax rates for di⁄erent
tax bases.
6 Conclusions
We test for the dominance of horizontal or vertical tax externalities in a federation of inde-
pendent benevolent tax-setting authorities. An empirically testable discriminating criterion
is derived, building on the model by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). Theory predicts that
state tax rates decrease with the fragmentation of a federation (and hence the relative
smallness of states) if horizontal externalities dominate but increase with fragmentation if
strumented cantonal tax rates in Tables 6 and 7. Coe¢ cient estimates on most controls are stable across
individual tax instruments.
26vertical externalities dominate.
Exploiting the institutional variety of the Swiss multi-federation system of ￿scally au-
tonomous cantons and municipalities, we estimate the discriminatory relationship empiri-
cally. Each of the 26 cantons is taken to represent a federation, while the municipalities
correspond to sub-federal ￿states￿ . Swiss cantons provide a close approximation of the fed-
eral ￿scal structures that characterize the relevant theoretical model. While tax schedules
vary widely across cantons and tax rates vary similarly widely across both cantons and
municipalities, the tax bases of hierarchically nested governments are virtually identical.
Since the theory in addition crucially depends on the assumption that lower-level govern-
ments are benevolent, we apply our estimations to a sample of municipalities featuring a
high degree of direct-democratic participation in the setting of local taxes.
We ￿nd that, on average, municipal tax rates increase in the relative smallness of mu-
nicipalities. Hence, vertical externalities are found to dominate overall. Our evidence thus
supports the existence of vertical tax externalities among states with benevolent tax setting:
vertical tax externalities that dominate the e⁄ects of horizontal externalities are more than
a theoretical curiosity.
This ￿nding naturally raises two questions: are local taxes in Switzerland too high?
and: is our result likely to extend to other countries?
The answer to the ￿rst question is ￿not necessarily￿ . The theory features a two-level
jurisdictional hierarchy and for welfare calculations considers only the utility of federation
residents. Hence, to transpose the welfare result from the theory to our empirical context
is to narrow the normative focus to individual cantons: taking the point of view of citizens￿
welfare in a particular canton, taking taxes in the entire rest of the world including the other
cantons as given, our result indeed implies that average municipal tax rates are too high.
However, allowing for further interdependencies, this result no longer necessarily holds, since
it may be that average municipal taxes are too low for Switzerland as a whole (if horizontal
tax externalities among cantons are so strong as to o⁄set the vertical externalities inside
of cantons). This normative indeterminacy extends a fortiori to a welfare calculus that
encompasses tax interactions beyond the national borders.
As for the generality of our ￿nding, we deem it useful in itself that a novel theoretical
27result with considerable policy implications can be shown to hold empirically somewhere. If
we are to speculate nonetheless on whether our speci￿c empirical setting is more propitious
to vertical externalities than other real-world federations, there is one clear reason to think
this not to be the case. The model shows the relative weight of vertical externalities to
increase with the size of the federal relative to the sub-federal public sector. In our empirical
setting, sub-federal tax revenue on average corresponds to around 70 percent of federal
revenue (see Table 1). In many federations, the sub-federal ￿scal share is considerably
lower, and the associated scope for vertical externalities thus correspondingly higher, than
this. Conversely, however, the benevolent-government model is unlikely to correspond as
well to other empirical settings as to the one analyzed in this paper, which might make
other federations relatively less susceptible to vertical externalities. Empirical research on
the three-way interaction among tax externalities, ￿scal decentralization and government
objective functions would thus be useful.
By way of a concluding conjecture, we note that ￿vertical￿tax externalities can arise
also among jurisdictions that are not linked through a higher layer of government. What
matters is that, for a given size of the tax base in jurisdiction A, the size of the tax base
in some jurisdiction B a⁄ects the welfare of residents in jurisdiction A. One example is
provided by Hau￿ er and Wooton (2001). In their model, three countries compete through
pro￿t taxation to host a globally mobile ￿rm. Hosting the ￿rm bene￿ts a country￿ s residents
because it saves them trade costs on the goods they purchase from that ￿rm. Two of the
three countries form a customs union and each union member is better o⁄if the ￿rm locates
in the other union country rather than outside the union. In the absence of intra-union
coordination, each union country internalizes only its own share of the (potential) bene￿t of
attracting the ￿rm to the union, and hence the union countries set suboptimally high taxes.
It is straightforward to extend this example: such externalities can arise in the presence
of any type of spatial externalities, such as input-output linkages among ￿rms, knowledge
spillovers, labor-market spillovers or environmental externalities.32 The logic of ￿vertical￿
tax externalities thus extends well beyond the case of ￿scal federations.
32In the case of negative spillovers, e.g. in the form of pollution, the vertical externality would of course
induce suboptimally low tax rates.
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30A Appendix: Simulations
For Proposition 1 to be valid, we need Et to be negative for all possible parameter val-
ues. However, the sign of Et in (9), cannot be determined without further assumptions or
resorting to simulations. We explore this issue via simulations, which we summarize here.
We choose the following production function:
F (Kj) = AK￿
j :
Pro￿t maximization then implies






K0 (￿ + ￿j) = ￿
Kj
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿j)
:
Similarly, using the FOC of pro￿t maximization, the rent function becomes
￿ (￿ + ￿j) = (1 ￿ ￿)AK￿
j :
In addition, we posit the following indirect utility function:
Uj = (e ￿ Sj) + B ln[(1 + ￿)Sj + ￿ (￿ + ￿j)] + g￿
jG￿:
Thus, we have "g = ￿ and "G = ￿. Utility maximization implies the following expression
for savings:
S (￿;￿j) = B ￿















Finally, joining these expressions, we obtain
Wj = (e ￿ S (￿;￿j)) + B ln[(1 + ￿)S (￿;￿j) + ￿ (￿ + ￿j)]






j TK (￿ + ￿j)
￿￿
:





























We are interested in signing the derivative of the above condition with respect to t
(evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium):
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In order to determine the sign Et, we perform a grid search across a range of parameter
values via a simulation program in Maple. The parameters in the model are A, B, ￿, ￿, ￿
and T. We simulate all possible permutations for ￿ve di⁄erent and even spaced values of
every parameter. This implies a maximum of 15,625 observations. Note that, by de￿nition,
￿, ￿ and ￿ range between zero and one. The program solves, in each loop, for the equilibrium
values of the state tax rate t and the rate of return in the federation ￿ and then evaluates
Et (and K, ￿ and Wt) at this solution.
For the parameters A and B we choose the values 0.1, 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1; whereas T
takes on the values 0.01, 0.11, 0.21, 0.31 and 0.41. As for the remaining parameters (￿, ￿
and ￿), the loops start at di⁄erent values with four increments of 0.2 in di⁄erent simulation
runs. Not all parameter combinations yield a solution for state tax rates. Conversely, in
some cases, multiple solutions can be obtained, depending on starting values fed into the
solution algorithm. Hence, we impose ￿ = 0 as the starting value for the solution algorithm
in runs 3 to 20. This may be considered a natural starting point, as it implies that the
federation rate of return equals that in the Rest of the World.
Table A1 reports the main results. Our simulations are quite conclusive. Et is negative
in 260,566 cases out of the 260,629 parameter con￿gurations for which a solution for ￿
and t exists. The 63 cases yielding a positive Et all obtain for two particular values of ￿,
and further experimentation shows that an in￿nitesimal deviation from these values again
results in either no solution or strictly negative simulated values for Et.
As a by-product Table A1 reports the number of observations for which the equilibrium
implies the dominance of vertical externalities (Wt < 0). Signi￿cant numbers of solutions
corresponding to dominant vertical externalities are found in all simulation runs.
32Run
Loop start








1 19=100 (automated) 11,301 0 808
2 19=100 2 11,390 0 807
3 1=100 0 13,572 0 3,050
4 2=100 0 13,686 0 2,718
5 3=100 0 13,735 0 2,523
6 4=100 0 13,762 0 2,343
7 5=100 0 13,770 0 2,163
8 6=100 0 13,747 0 2,015
9 7=100 0 13,706 0 1,875
10 8=100 0 13,657 0 1,764
11 9=100 0 13,598 0 1,638
12 10=100 0 13,309 29 1,700
13 11=100 0 13,476 0 1,454
14 12=100 0 13,342 0 1,354
15 13=100 0 13,212 0 1,276
16 14=100 0 13,053 0 1,171
17 15=100 0 12,324 34 1,213
18 16=100 0 12,728 0 1,007
19 17=100 0 12,430 0 926
20 19=100 0 10,831 0 807
Total 260,629 63 32,612
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Figure 2: Relative tax-base elasticities, tax distortions, and
fragmentation
Assumed functional forms are described in the Appendix. Parameter values are: A = B = 5, "g=0.2, T =
0.21. W t(x) implies x = "G. Variation in the relative size of government is obtained by changing ￿. Solid
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Figure 3: Relative government sizes, tax distortions, and
fragmentation
Assumed functional forms are described in the Appendix. Parameter values are: A = B = 5, "g = 0.2, T
= 0.21. W t(x) implies x = ￿. Variation in the relative size of government is obtained by changing "G.
Solid lines: N = 10, dotted lines: N = 5 dashed lines: N = 50.
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Figure 4: Variation in sub-federal tax rates across Swiss cantons
Sum of cantonal and municipal tax rates on representative median-income household in 2001. Municipal
tax rates are taken for capital town in each canton.
35Municipalities Cantons
1985 2000 1985 2000
Tax base Revenue % Revenue % Revenue % Revenue %
Private income 8,296 73.9 14,283 70.6 10,418 64.2
Wealth 690 6.1 1,723 8.5 895 5.5 19,536 68.5
Corporate inc. 1,122 10.0 2,378 11.8 1,767 10.9
Capital 350 3.1 458 2.3 547 3.4 4,742 16.6
Other taxes 764 6.8 1,384 6.8 2,640 16.1 4,234 14.8
Total 11,222 100.0 20,226 100.0 16,237 100.0 28,512 100.0
Table 1: Sources of municipal and cantonal tax revenue, 1985 and 2000
Nominal revenues for all Swiss municipalities/cantons in million francs. ￿Other taxes￿include mainly
property, gift and inheritance taxes. Breakdown of personal and corporate tax revenues of cantons not









Tax index 507 0.00 0.86 Freienbach (SZ) Le Locle (NE)
Personal income tax rate
single, median inc 512 4.26 1.13 Freienbach (SZ) Le Locle (NE)
married, median inc. 512 3.68 1.18 Freienbach (SZ) Le Locle (NE)
married, high inc. 512 10.60 2.44 Freienbach (SZ) Amriswil (TG)
Personal wealth tax rate
wealth = CHF200,000 512 0.13 0.07 Baar (ZG) Glarus (GL)
wealth = CHF5,000,000 512 0.31 0.06 Freienbach (SZ) Solothurn (SO)
Corporate income tax rate
2% pro￿tability 507 3.67 1.60 Herisau (AR) (several)
9% pro￿tability 507 5.06 1.81 Freienbach (SZ) Porrentruy (JU)
32% pro￿tability 507 7.35 2.44 Freienbach (SZ) Solothurn (SO)
Corp. capital tax rate 507 0.20 0.09 Baar (ZG) Glarus (GL)
Smallness 512 0.93 0.08 Scha⁄hausen (SH) Nidau (BE)
Population 512 19,769 24,195 Appenzell (AI) GenŁve (GE)
Share of pop. under 20 512 0.17 0.04 Renens (VD) Einsiedeln (SZ)
Share of pop. over 65 512 0.19 0.03 Volketswil (ZH) Zollikon (ZH)
Area (hectares) 512 1,927 2,788 Nidau (BE) Davos (GR)
Urban center dummy 512 0.40 0.49 (several) (several)
Distance to freeway (km) 512 4.44 7.44 Morges (VD) St. Moritz (GR)
Distance to airport (km) 512 50.66 32.39 Meyrin (GE) St. Moritz (GR)
Lake shore (meters) 512 2,185 4,503 (several) Einsiedeln (SZ)
Canton-level variables
Tax index 512 0.00 0.88 Schwyz Geneva
Latin dummy 512 0.27 0.45 (several) (several)
Harmonized-tax dummy 512 0.21 0.41 (several) (several)
Urbanized population 512 368,479 312,097 (several) Z￿rich
Area (hectares) 512 228,616 200,429 Appenzell (AI) Graub￿nden
Table 2: Summary statistics (referendum sample)
Tax rates in percent. Municipalities in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden do not levy corporate taxes.
























































































Number of observations 185 507
R2 0:79 0:65




F statistic of ￿rst-stage regression 17:33 6:60
Table 3: Tax index regressions, panel
Beta coe¢ cients in parentheses, standard errors below. *** signi￿cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Year
dummies and intercept included in all regressions. All non-dichotomous variables are in natural logs.
Two-stage least squares regressions, with cantonal tax indices instrumented using all exogenous regressors
plus cantonal agglomeration population and cantonal area as instruments. Standard errors and ￿rst-stage
F statistics based on robust covariance matrices, clustered by municipality. Hansen J statistics calculated
without Uri (both samples) and Latin (assembly sample) dummies due to insu¢ cient degrees of freedom;
P values below.
37dep. var. = munic. tax index 2SLS spatial GMM OLS





























































































































































































































































Number of observations 37 37 37 37 37 37
R2 0:84 0:77 0:84 0:76 0:84 0:77








F statistic of 1st-st. regression 14:25 4:65 20:52 8:91








Table 4: Tax-index regressions for individual years: assembly sample
Beta coe¢ cients in parentheses, standard errors below. *** signi￿cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Intercept included in all regressions. All non-dichotomous variables are in natural logs. 2SLS and spatial
GMM: cantonal tax indices are instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus cantonal agglomeration
population and cantonal area as instruments. Spatial GMM: based on Conley (1999), with neighborhood
distance cuto⁄ of 15 km. Standard errors and ￿rst-stage F statistics based on robust covariance matrices.
Hansen J statistics calculated without Uri and Latin dummies due to insu¢ cient degrees of freedom; P
values below. Moran I statistic calculated using 15 km distance bands and a binary distance weighting
matrix; P values below.
38dep. var. = munic. tax index 2SLS spatial GMM OLS















































































































































































































































































Number of observations 102 101 102 101 102 101
R2 0:66 0:63 0:67 0:69 0:73 0:73








F statistic of 1st-st. regression 15:14 1:41 15:90 1:28








Table 5: Tax-index regressions for individual years: referendum sample
Beta coe¢ cients in parentheses, standard errors below. *** signi￿cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Intercept included in all regressions. All non-dichotomous variables are in natural logs. 2SLS and spatial
GMM: cantonal tax indices are instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus cantonal agglomeration
population and cantonal area as instruments. Spatial GMM: based on Conley (1999), with neighborhood
distance cuto⁄ of 15 km. Standard errors and ￿rst-stage F statistics based on robust covariance matrices.
Hansen J statistics calculated without Uri dummy due to insu¢ cient degrees of freedom; P values below.





































































































Table 6: Regressions for individual tax instruments: panel, assembly sample
Beta coe¢ cients in parentheses, standard errors below. *** signi￿cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Intercept included in all regressions. All non-dichotomous variables are in natural logs. Non-reported
controls are identical to Table 5; except St. Gallen and harmonized-tax dummies, which are not included
for corporate taxes, and Uri dummy, which is not included for wealth and corporate taxes. Cantonal tax
rates are instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus cantonal agglomeration population and cantonal
area as instruments. Standard errors and ￿rst-stage F statistics based on robust covariance matrices.





































































































Table 7: Regressions for individual tax instruments: panel, referendum sample
Beta coe¢ cients in parentheses, standard errors below. *** signi￿cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Intercept included in all regressions. All non-dichotomous variables are in natural logs. Non-reported
controls are identical to Table 5; except St. Gallen and harmonized-tax dummies, which are not included
for corporate taxes, and Uri dummy, which is not included for wealth and corporate taxes. Cantonal tax
rates are instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus cantonal agglomeration population and cantonal
area as instruments. Standard errors and ￿rst-stage F statistics based on robust covariance matrices.
Hansen J statistics calculated without Uri dummy due to insu¢ cient degrees of freedom; P values below.
41